
























OpenAIR takedown statement: 
 
 This publication is made 
freely available under 






This is the ______________________ version of an article originally published by ____________________________ 
in __________________________________________________________________________________________ 
(ISSN _________; eISSN __________). 
This publication is distributed under a CC ____________ license. 
____________________________________________________
 
Section 6 of the “Repository policy for OpenAIR @ RGU” (available from http://www.rgu.ac.uk/staff-and-current-
students/library/library-policies/repository-policies) provides guidance on the criteria under which RGU will 
consider withdrawing material from OpenAIR. If you believe that this item is subject to any of these criteria, or for 
any other reason should not be held on OpenAIR, then please contact openair-help@rgu.ac.uk with the details of 
the item and the nature of your complaint. 
 
 





Extradition is important. It serves vital purposes. Lord Thomas in the 
Divisional Court stated that there is: 
… a constant and weighty public interest in extradition that those 
accused of crimes should be brought to trial; that those convicted of 
crimes should serve their sentences; that the UK should honour its 
international obligations and the UK should not become a safe haven.1 
The centrepiece of UK extradition is the hearing. It plays the operative role 
in the rendition of accused and convicted persons from the UK to third 
states. In light of the significance of extradition and the centrality of 
extradition hearings it is not unreasonable to assume that their nature 
would be settled. This is not the case. Extradition hearings are 
multifariously understood. This is largely because various existential 
questions – what they are, what they do, what rules govern them – arise 
in different contexts and are answered with reference to distinct law. There 
are three such contexts. They are disputes over the applicable procedural 
and evidential rules, uncertainty as to their designation for the purposes of 
appeal and debates concerning the applicability of the right to a fair trial to 
them. Each of these contexts is framed by a body of rules. These obviously 
include the Extradition Act 2003 (2003 Act), the core piece of UK extradition 
law. Also relevant, however, is the law specific to each - procedural and 
evidential rules, provision governing appeals from the High Court of 
Justiciary to the Supreme Court and human rights law. Whilst extradition 
hearings are variously understood across the UK the issue has a particular 
Scottish resonance. This is due to the unique rules of criminal procedure 
and evidence and terms of the devolution settlement. Two of the three 
contexts, therefore, have a distinctly Scottish aspect. This article firstly 
argues that the variation in conception of extradition hearings is explained 
by the fact that the same broad question of what extradition hearings are 
arises in three contexts where distinct law is relied upon to provide the 
answer. It suggests that an analysis and synthesis of these views leads to 
a single understanding of extradition hearings as sui generis quasi-criminal 
proceedings affected by international considerations. Secondly, it is argued 
that the acceptance of this conceptualisation matters. In addition to 
facilitating comprehension, a single understanding of extradition hearings 
can be a platform from which the law can develop in a manner based upon 
clear and agreed foundations. With extradition hearings singly and 
                                   
∗ The author is grateful to Professor Mair and an anonymous reviewer for their 
helpful comments on an earlier version of this article.  
1 Polish Judicial Authorities v Celinski [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin) at para 6, 
referring to the judgment of Lady Hale in Norris v Government of the United States 
(No. 2) [2010] UKSC 9 at para 8. There is a large body of writing in the area. Of 
particular note are the House of Lords Select Committee on Extradition Law, 
Extradition: UK Law and Practice,  10 March 2015, cited at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldselect/ldextradition/126/126.pd
f and A Review of Extradition, published in September 2011 (the Baker Review), 
cited at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/.../extradition-review.pdf. 
positively understood, the law governing and affecting them can evolve in 
a more coherent and defensible way. This article supports the adoption of 
such a conceptualisation.  
 
2. Dicta and Commentary    
 
The varied understandings of extradition hearings are readily seen in 
judicial dicta and commentary on the subject. There are two camps into 
which a number of these views fall, one which considers extradition 
hearings unique and one which sees them as criminal in nature (albeit not 
criminal trials).2 In other instances extradition hearings are conceived in 
the negative and are described in terms of what they are not, rather than 
what they are. Dicta and commentary favouring the unique nature of 
extradition proceedings includes that found in Goatley v HMA where Lord 
Nimmo Smith held, in addressing a possible appeal to the House of Lords, 
“Although extradition proceedings before the sheriff and before this court 
under the 2003 Act are best regarded as being sui generis, they are 
nevertheless more akin to criminal than to civil proceedings”.3 In Mirza v 
Lord Advocate Sheriff Crowe, following a request for disclosure, stated “I 
do not consider that the sheriff is at liberty to alter the nature of his judicial 
role, even in extradition proceedings, which are sui generis”.4 Whilst not 
terming them sui generis, Renton and Brown states that extradition 
proceedings “… are not criminal”.5 On the other hand, in Kapri v HMA, the 
Lord Justice Clerk stated in the context of a human rights argument that 
whilst extradition proceedings have been said to be sui generis “It is more 
accurate to say that the rules of criminal evidence and procedure are, in 
the absence of some special circumstances, normally applicable”.6 A similar 
view was put forward by Lord Phillips in R (USA) v Bow Street Magistrates 
Court where, in the context of a disclosure request, he said “Extradition 
proceedings are criminal proceedings, albeit of a very special kind”.7 These 
statements give an indication of the present position. There is clearly an 
inconsistency in view. As will be seen, that variation correlates, to an 
extent, to the context in which the view was expressed.  
 
                                   
2 It is apparent that there is also no single judicial or legislative conception of what 
makes a hearing ‘criminal’. In the three contexts discussed the answers appear to 
be the applicability of criminal rules, the proceedings being conducted by a 
prosecutor and the determination of a criminal charge. It is submitted that a 
reasonable proposition is that a hearing is criminal if it is a part of a set of 
proceedings envisaging, or subsequent to, the determination of a criminal charge 
within the jurisdiction. Academically, a brief discussion of what makes proceedings 
criminal is found in Williams, G., The Definition of Crime, (1955) 8 Current Legal 
Problems 107 at 128-130. 
3 2008 JC 1, at para 36. Whilst accepting that devolution minutes were competent 
within extradition proceedings the High Court rejected Goatley’s argument that the 
general bar of appeal to the House of Lords (and now Supreme Court) was 
discriminatory and thus unlawful. 
4 [2015] SC Edin 32, at para 15. 
5 Gordon, G.H., and Gane, C.H.W., Renton and Brown’s Criminal Procedure, 6th 
Edition, W. Green, Edinburgh, 2017, Vol. 1, Chp. 1, at para 1-42. 
6 [2014] HCJAC 33, at para 125. This case is discussed below.  
7 [2007] 1 WLR 1157 at para 76. 
3. Courts and Powers of the Judge  
 
The courts in which extradition hearings take place and the powers of the 
judge within them are of considerable relevance to the conclusions drawn 
on their nature. If, say, the courts and powers are exclusively criminal the 
case for extradition hearings being properly deemed such is considerably 
strengthened. On the other hand if there are a number departures and 
exceptions the case is weakened. The courts in which hearings take place 
and the powers of judges within them are provided for by the 2003 Act. As 
regards the former, ss 67 and 130 stipulate that extradition hearings in 
Scotland must take place in front of the Sheriff of Lothian and Borders. In 
England and Wales hearings take place in Westminster Magistrates’ Court. 
Appeals in Scotland are to the High Court of Justiciary, and in England the 
Divisional Court. The Supreme Court may hear extradition appeals from 
both. These facts shed some light on the nature of extradition hearings – 
particularly that the High Court hears appeals and that the Supreme Court 
has competence to hear certain appeals from it. The former fact indicates 
that extradition hearings are criminal, whilst the latter that they may be in 
some sense unorthodox.  
 
The powers of the judge at an extradition hearing in Scotland, governed by 
s 9(2) of the 2003 Act, are both reflective of, and partly responsible for, the 
variation in understanding. It provides that an extradition judge has the 
same powers (as nearly as may be) as if the proceedings were summary 
proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by the 
person in respect of whom the Part 1 warrant was issued.8 The ‘as nearly 
as may be’ qualification is significant. It is reflective of the fact that 
extradition hearings are related to criminal matters, yet apart from them. 
It is necessary to except the powers that are ill-suited to extradition. The 
section is responsible for causing opacity simply because extradition 
hearings are not criminal trials. Slovak Republic v Havrilova9 is an example. 
Here the High Court held that the sheriff had been incorrect to hold that the 
ordinary 40 day time limit for remand in custody under s 147(1) of the 
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (1995 Act) had been incorporated 
into extradition by s 9(2) of the 2003 Act. The Lord Advocate successfully 
argued that in extradition cases there is no complaint or trial – terms 
conditioning the application of s 147 – therefore it did not apply. 
Commenting upon Slovak Republic v Havrilova Sheriff Brown notes that 
“Extradition procedure is not, and never has been, equivalent to trial of the 
offence; committal has always been the better analogy”.10 This comparison 
                                   
8 There is similar provision throughout the UK, with s 9(1) pertaining to England 
and Wales and 9(3) to Northern Ireland. Part 1 warrants follow requests under the 
European Arrest Warrant. Section 77(2) of the 2003 Act applies somewhat similarly 
to cases arising under Part 2 of the Act where requests originate from outwith the 
EU. 
9 [2011] HCJAC 113. The case is discussed further below.  
10 Brown, A., et al, Renton and Brown’s Criminal Procedure Legislation, W. Green, 
Edinburgh, 2017, para A146- 003. Extradition proceedings are somewhat similar 
to the now abolished committal for trial procedure in England in that they entailed, 
in certain circumstances, a determination by a Magistrate whether there was a 
prima facie against a defendant. See 
is not inapt, supporting, as it may be understood to be, the quasi-criminal 
nature of extradition hearings.  
 
4. Rules of Procedure and Evidence  
 
One of the three contexts in which courts have addressed the nature of 
extradition hearings is the determination of applicable rules of procedure 
and evidence. This context evinces the greatest variation in conclusion, with 
certain cases holding that extradition hearings are criminal and others that 
they are sui generis. Determinative in these cases is, of course, the 
germane law. The starting point here is the 2003 Act itself, containing 
several extradition-specific rules of procedure and evidence. Of particular 
relevance is s 206. It provides that questions arising at extradition hearings 
must be decided by applying any enactment or rule of law that would apply 
if the proceedings were proceedings for an offence, the requested person 
was charged with an offence and the requesting state was the prosecution. 
As with the powers of the judge, therefore, the starting points for the 
burden and standard of proof are those pertaining in criminal trials. There 
are exceptions to this, however. One is found in s 7(3), which provides that 
the determination of the identity of the individual subject to an arrest 
warrant is on the balance of probabilities. In Scotland, the requirement of 
corroboration is dispensed with for this determination as well, under s 
7(7)(b). These exceptions cover Part 1 cases, with similar provisions 
applying as regards Part 2. Corroboration is also not required where a prima 
facie case against the requested person must be made out under s 84(1) 
of the 2003 Act – applying to non-EU states not exempted from that 
requirement. Under the 2003 Act, then, the position is that the criminal 
rules apply, with exceptions.  
 
Supplementing the statutory provisions within the 2003 Act is, in Scotland, 
Chapter 34 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 1996.11 It is relatively scant, 
providing for interpretation, arrest under provisional warrant, a procedural 
hearing, leave to appeal, the hearing of appeals, time limits and extensions, 
consent to extradition and Part 3 warrants (which cover extradition to the 
UK). In England and Wales, in contrast, Part 50 of the Criminal Procedure 
Rules is comprised of 32 separate rules covering such matters as 
adjournment, case management, preliminary hearing and, to an extent, 
evidence.12 This difference in detail is of note because the relative dearth 
of rules in Scotland leads to a greater degree of uncertainty as regards the 
nature of extradition hearings – a thorough iteration of criminally-related 
                                   
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/faster-justice-as-unneccessary-
committal-hearings-are-abolished, and Bell, B., and Dadomo, C., Magistrates’ 
Courts and the Reforms of the Criminal Justice System, (2006) 14 Eur J. Crime 
Crim L Just 339. 
11 The Criminal Procedure Rules are found in schedule 2 to the Act of Adjournal 
(Criminal Procedure Rules) 1996/513.  
12  Cited at https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-
rules/criminal/docs/2015/crim-proc-rules-2015-part-50.pdf. Of note is s 174 of the 
Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 which subjected appeals to the 
High Court in extradition cases in England to the Criminal Procedure Rules. The 
Civil Procedure Rules applied previously. 
rules would, of course, favour that classification. The relatively skeletal 
nature of the rules in Scotland has contributed to the emergence of a body 
of jurisprudence that addresses hitherto unanswered questions. That 
jurisprudence in turn is responsible for contributing to the multifarious 
understanding of extradition hearings.  
 
4.1 Procedural and Evidential Jurisprudence 
 
Scottish cases explicitly or implicitly addressing the nature of extradition 
hearings in the context of procedure and evidence include Kapri v HMA13, 
Lord Advocate v Shapovalov14, Slovak Republic v Havrilova15 and Lord 
Advocate v Mirza. 16  These authorities demonstrate the discordance 
between certain rules of criminal procedure and evidence and extradition 
law and practice. The jurisprudence also, arguably, evinces the origins of 
the acceptance of a hybrid code of extradition procedure and evidence. In 
Kapri v HMA the High Court had to decide whether systemic corruption in 
Albania was such to give rise to a real risk of a flagrant denial of justice 
were the requested person returned.17 The Lord Justice Clerk raised the 
question of which code of evidence was to be applied in the case: criminal 
(with the prohibition on hearsay) or civil.18 Kapri’s counsel argued that 
everything which his witness had spoken to or included in his report ought 
to be taken into account by the court. Whilst proceedings were to take the 
form of a summary trial, he argued, nothing in the 2003 Act demonstrated 
that parties were tied to any particular evidential rules. The respondent 
averred that the summary rules of criminal procedure and evidence applied. 
This was clear, he argued, on the basis of judicial dicta – mentioned below 
– and provisions within the 2003 Act. Of particular relevance was s 202, 
providing that documents authenticated in Category 1 and 2 territories may 
be received in evidence and, importantly, that this does not mean that a 
document that is not duly authenticated cannot be received. The 
respondent concluded that whatever the technical rules it was possible for 
the court to look at reports from reputable human rights bodies, whether 
they were subject to an admission or presented through the perspective of 
an expert witness.19 The parties agreed in this regard.  
 
In addressing the evidential rules the Lord Justice Clerk held that under the 
2003 Act the rules of evidence must be those applicable to criminal cases, 
referring to s 77(2)(b) and 206(1) and (2) of the 2003 Act. As noted, he 
stated it was more accurate to say that the rules of criminal procedure and 
evidence are in the absence of some special circumstances normally 
                                   
13 Supra note 6.  
14 [2017] SC Edin 83. 
15 Supra note 9.  
16 Supra note 4.  
17 The case had been remitted from the Supreme Court, Kapri v Lord Advocate 
[2013] UKSC 48 at para 33. See Arnell, P., Extradition and Systemic Corruption in 
Albania, (2014) 17 Scots Law Times 74. 
18 Supra note 6 at para 12. 
19 Ibid at para 99. 
applicable, rather than extradition proceedings are sui generis.20 The lack 
of a hybrid code of evidence applicable to extradition cases was noted by 
the Lord Justice Clerk. The law permitted many official documents to be 
relied upon in evidence without having been spoken to, and s 202 of the 
2003 Act provided specifically for this in regard to documents from 
requesting states. However, the Lord Justice Clerk held, “… there is no 
general provision which allows the court to hold as proof as fact, merely by 
their production, the content of reports or other papers emanating from 
foreign governments, international governmental or non-governmental 
bodies, or academic or research institutions”.21 The Court decided that it 
would proceed, with grave reservations about the evidential base, on its 
understanding of what the witnesses themselves said about the nature and 
extent of corruption in Albania. Kapri v HMA, then, supports the normal 
applicability of rules of criminal evidence, and as such the criminal nature 
of extradition hearings. It also illustrates the tensions that can arise where 
unorthodox evidence is put forward.22  
 
Lord Advocate v Shapovalov, as Kapri v HMA, lends support to the criminal 
nature of extradition hearings. It also brings to the fore the terminological 
incongruence that can arise where rules of criminal procedure and evidence 
are applied within extradition hearings. At issue in the case was the possible 
applicability of statements of uncontroversial evidence (SUEs) under s 258 
of the 1995 Act. SUEs allow a party to criminal proceedings to identify facts 
which are unlikely to be disputed and to serve them on the other party. 
Section 258 also creates a scheme whereby SUEs can be challenged. Here 
the requested person lodged two SUEs inter alia stating that he would be 
detained in non-article 3 compliant conditions in Russia if extradited. The 
Lord Advocate challenged the competency of s 258 in extradition and the 
facts specified within them. In doing so he referred to Kapri v HMA and 
stated “The clear thrust of Kapri is that the default position is that the rules 
of criminal evidence are applicable. The exception is where there are special 
circumstances”.23 There were special circumstances, he argued, that led to 
the inapplicability of SUEs. These took the form of s 77(2) of the 2003 Act 
(which referred to powers of the judge not a party to serve notice) and s 
258 of the 1995 Act (alluding to a preliminary hearing, intermediate diet 
and trial diet). In response the sheriff held that as SUEs are part of the 
“‘normal rules’ of summary criminal proceedings… unless they conflict or 
are irreconcilable with the provisions of sec 77, they form part of extradition 
procedure”.24 He also rejected the argument based on the timetable in s 
258 because, in his view, it took an “unduly narrow approach to found on 
                                   
20 Ibid at para 125.  
21 Ibid at para 127. The Lord Justice Clerk later noted that members of the court 
were familiar with certain of such reports through immigration cases where “… the 
rules (or rather the absence of rules) applicable to civil administrative proceedings 
prevail”, at para 128. The affinity between extradition and deportation is mentioned 
below. 
22 Significantly, in Kurtev v Lord Advocate, [2018] HCJAC 31 the Lord Justice Clerk 
disagreed with the suggestion that Kapri v HMA gave rise to a perception that the 
criminal rules of evidence apply in their full rigour, at para 9. 
23 Supra note 14 at para 13. 
24 Ibid at para 19. 
the specific terminology, and such an approach runs contrary to the 
inclusive language of the authorities relied upon”.25 ‘Special circumstances’, 
the sheriff held, referred to “… surrounding facts. Drafting or terminology 
issues are not ‘circumstances’”.26 The sheriff held that s 258 applied to 
extradition hearings, but rejected Shapovalov’s application to disregard the 
challenge to them. Lord Advocate v Shapovalov lends somewhat strained 
support to the criminal nature of extradition hearings. It emphasises the 
presumptive applicability of summary cause rules, save where there are 
special circumstances. SUEs were held to apply within extradition in spite 
of the terms governing them ill-according with the specifics of extradition 
procedure.  
 
Supporting the sui generis nature of extradition hearings, and contrasting 
with Kapri v HMA and Lord Advocate v Shapovalov, are Lord Advocate v 
Mirza and Slovak Republic v Havrilova. The two cases suggest that a distinct 
approach to the applicable rules of procedure and evidence in extradition is 
developing. In Lord Advocate v Mirza a requested person sought disclosure 
or recovery of documents. The sheriff held that the rules of disclosure had 
no place in extradition hearings. The duty of disclosure applied to the 
prosecution in order that information is provided to an accused. Since an 
extradition is not prosecution, an application for disclosure was 
incompetent. The application for recovery of documents was also rejected 
by the sheriff. He noted that the procedure to be followed in summary 
criminal proceedings under s 301A of the 1995 Act was not clear, and the 
Criminal Procedure Rules provided no guidance – in regard to criminal 
proceedings let alone extradition hearings. He held that it was incompetent 
to make an oral application for recovery or production of documents at the 
bar of the court in an extradition hearing (as counsel for the requested 
person had done). He made this decision, he said, on the basis of 
expediency, basic fairness and want of due notice considerations.27 The 
sheriff disposed of the case by holding that the appropriate remedy for the 
requested person was to seek to recover the documents in the Court of 
Session in the proceeds of crime proceedings against him. By pronouncing 
upon the incompetence of disclosure Lord Advocate v Mirza exposes a basic 
difference between extradition and criminal proceedings. It does so by 
simply noting the fact an extradition hearing does not entail or envisage, 
within this jurisdiction, a prosecution – Mirza was not, in Scotland, an 
accused. The rules of disclosure and recovery, therefore, did not extend to 
extradition. 
 
An important authority favouring a sui generis conception of extradition 
hearings is Slovak Republic v Havrilova. Whilst the case was relied upon by 
the Lord Justice Clerk in Kapri v HMA in support of their criminal nature that 
view is open to question. Properly interpreted, it is submitted, Slovak 
                                   
25 Ibid at para 25. A similar approach to the wording of s 258 was used to reject 
the Lord Advocate’s argument that the SUEs were incompetent on account of being 
submitted late under s 258(2ZA). The sheriff held that the “… application of 
summary procedure should not be defeated by artificially cleaving to terminology”, 
at para 34.  
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid at para 7. 
Republic v Havrilova lends weight to the view that extradition hearings are 
unique with extradition-specific rules taking precedence over summary 
cause rules. Put another way, the case suggests that the rules of criminal 
procedure apply in a supplementary or secondary sense, rather than being 
prima facie applicable. In Slovak Republic v Havrilova the High Court held 
that s 9(2) of the 2003 Act did not engage by virtue of its wording the 
provisions of s 147(1) of the 1995 Act. Significantly, the High Court 
described the relationship between the rules of procedure and evidence and 
extradition-related rules differently than it had been in Kapri v HMA. It 
stated “It is plain that s 9(2) is intended to bring into play in extradition 
proceedings, whenever circumstances allow, the rules of summary cause 
procedure and evidence... The person in extradition proceedings in respect 
of whom extradition is sought has not been charged with a summary offence 
under the 1995 Act”.28 The court here referred to the dictum of Lord Phillips 
in R (USA) v Bow Street Magistrates Court, quoted in part above. The 
extended passage cited in Slovak Republic v Havrilova included “The judge 
should apply the normal rules of criminal evidence and procedure to the 
extent that the[s]e are appropriate having regard to the specifics of the 
statutory schemes in Part 1 and Part 2”.29 The point being made here is 
that the courts in these cases have accepted that the rules of criminal 
procedure are, in a sense, apart from extradition. Extradition-specific rules 
are prima facie applicable and criminal rules will come into play only where 
appropriate – most obviously where there are lacunae in extradition-specific 
rules. Admittedly, the distinction between these two approaches is a 
relatively fine one. The result in any specific case may well be the same 
regardless of which tact is taken. It is relevant, however, to the 
conceptualisation of extradition hearings. The existence of a separate body 
of extradition-specific legislative (and jurisprudential) rules applying in the 
first instance and taking precedence over rules of criminal procedure is 
significant in their designation as sui generis. 
 
The interpretation of Slovak Republic v Havrilova suggested above is 
supported by the English case of R. (on the application of B) v Westminster 
Magistrates’ Court. Here, before the Supreme Court, the parties agreed that 
as a matter of established practice the normal rules of evidence are relaxed 
in extradition hearings on issues arising under the heads of extraneous 
considerations, human rights and abuse of process.30 The Supreme Court 
did not challenge this agreement. Indeed, it stated “… under the current 
legislation, the better analysis may be not that the ordinary rules of 
evidence are suspended in the areas to which the practice is agreed to 
apply, but that a broad approach is taken to the nature and basis of the 
                                   
28 Ibid at para 13, emphasis added.  
29 Ibid at para 9, citing R (USA) v Bow Street Magistrates Court, supra note 7 at 
para 76. 
30 [2014] UKSC 59 at para 21. Extraneous considerations are where a requested 
person is sought or would be prejudiced at his trial or punished for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, gender, sexual orientation or political opinions. The relaxation 
is of considerable pedigree, dating from 1964, see Schtraks v Government of Israel 
[1964] AC 556, as noted in Hilali v Spain [2006] EWHC 1239 (Admin) at para 63. 
expert evidence that is admissible”.31 This case is a persuasive Supreme 
Court authority that explicitly provides that the approach to evidence in 
extradition hearings is apart from that taken in criminal proceedings. This 
approach should be explicitly adopted in Scotland. It would build upon 
Slovak Republic v Havrilova. This is desirable not only because it would 
represent a move towards a single coherent understanding of extradition 
hearings in Scotland, but also because it would enhance the similarity of 
position across the UK. As to the latter “… it is clearly desirable that there 
should be uniformity of construction and application of the relevant 
statutory provisions in the various jurisdictions of the United Kingdom”.32 
Overall, the law and jurisprudence governing and interpreting the rules of 
procedure and evidence in extradition hearings in Scotland fails to evince a 
consistent position. The relationship between the applicable criminal and 
extradition-specific rules is not settled. This is not ideal. What is clear, 
however, is that there are a number of extradition-specific rules as well as 
exceptions in, and limitations to, the operation of the rules of criminal 
procedure and evidence. This situation creates opacity and lies behind the 
varied designations of extradition hearings. As will be discussed below, 
these differing understandings lend support to a broad conceptualisation of 
extradition hearings as sui generis and quasi-criminal.   
 
5. Appeals from the High Court to the Supreme Court  
 
A second context in which the nature of extradition hearings has arisen is 
an appeal from the High Court of Justiciary to the Supreme Court.33 In this 
context what turned on the particular understanding was not which 
procedural or evidential rules applied but rather, inter alia, the powers of 
disposal the Supreme Court holds in such cases. In contrast to the mixed 
procedural and evidential authority the position here is unequivocal. It is 
that extradition hearings are not criminal proceedings. The basis for this 
view was the germane law, namely that found in the Scotland Act 1998 
(1998 Act), the 1995 Act and the 2003 Act. Creating the need for a 
pronouncement on the issue were the amendments to the former two Acts 
by the Scotland Act 2012 (2012 Act). Those amendments changed the 
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction as regards certain cases emanating from 
Scotland. In essence, the 2012 Act excluded some matters which had 
previously been ‘devolution issues’ from being so. Those issues became 
‘compatibility issues’. The 2012 Act defines compatibility issues, in s 
288ZA(2) of the 1995 Act, as questions arising in criminal proceedings as 
to whether a public authority has acted (or proposes to act) in a way which 
                                   
31 Ibid at para 23. 
32 Campbell v HMA, 2008 JC 265 at para 32 per Lord Nimmo Smith. Of course an 
equally strong case can be made that the rest of the UK follow Scotland’s lead as 
vice versa. There are, of course, extant divergences in extradition law within the 
UK, including the non-application of the forum bar and lack of abuse of process 
jurisdiction in Scotland. For the latter see Lord Advocate v Mirza, supra note 5 at p 
13. 
33 Appeals to the Supreme Court from the High Court are, of course, exceptional. 
In criminal cases, and extradition cases, the final court of appeal is the High Court 
– save in the especial circumstances mentioned presently. 
is made unlawful by section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998. The reason 
for excluding certain subject matter from devolution issues was not to limit 
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Both devolution issues and 
compatibility issues are within this jurisdiction.34 The reason appears to 
have been to deprive the Supreme Court of the power to quash convictions 
in light of a successful appeal from the High Court. 35  The relevant 
consequence of the amendments for our purposes was that they gave rise 
to the question of whether extradition proceedings were criminal 
proceedings or not. If they were then a human rights point arising in them 
would take the form of a compatibility issue on appeal to the Supreme 
Court. If not that question would remain a devolution issue.  
 
It was in Kapri v Lord Advocate that the question arose of whether 
extradition hearings were criminal proceedings in the context of an appeal 
to the Supreme Court. Counsel for the appellant had submitted in his 
written case, in essence, that extradition hearings were criminal 
proceedings. He suggested that a human rights question in an extradition 
case had become a compatibility issue. He had done so because, in his view, 
the focus of the case would widen from whether the act of a member of the 
Scottish Government was compatible with human rights – that member 
being the Lord Advocate in conducting the extradition proceedings and/or 
the Scottish Minister ordering his extradition to Albania.36 It would come to 
include the more general question of whether the determination of the 
compatibility issue was correct. The High Court is a public authority, so its 
acts can be scrutinised under the new system if they raise a compatibility 
issue, Kapri’s counsel argued. Also relevant, Lord Hope noted, was the fact 
that the powers of the Supreme Court turn upon the type of issue before it. 
Whilst there are no restrictions upon its powers following determination of 
a devolution issue, s 288AA(2) of the 1995 Act provides that the powers of 
the Supreme Court are exercisable only for the purpose of determining the 
compatibility issue. Once, determined, it must remit the case to the High 
Court of Justiciary, as per s 288AA(3). 
 
At the Supreme Court the Lord Advocate averred that extradition hearings 
were not criminal proceedings under the 1995 Act. This was because they 
did not involve the determination of a criminal charge.37 Importantly, the 
Lord Advocate highlighted the fact that he performs his extradition-related 
duties under s 191 of the 2003 Act as a member of the Scottish 
Government, not in his capacity as public prosecutor. That section provides 
that the Lord Advocate must conduct extradition proceedings in Scotland. 
As it turned out, before the Supreme Court, counsel for the appellant 
conceded that a human rights issue arising in an extradition case remained 
                                   
34 Under paragraph 13 of Schedule 6 to the 1998 Act as regards devolution issues 
(as held by Lord Hope in BH v Lord Advocate [2012] UKSC 24 at para 34) and s 
288AA(1) of the 1995 Act for compatibility issues. 
35 Shead, C.M., Devolution in Extradition Cases, (2013) Scottish Criminal Law 987, 
at p 988. 
36 As Albania is a Category 2 territory the final decision is made by the Scottish 
Ministers. 
37 Supra note 17 at para 18. 
a devolution issue. Lord Hope, however, noting the importance of the point, 
felt it worthwhile to comment upon the position. He agreed that extradition 
hearings were not criminal proceedings in this context.38 Lord Hope held 
that the Lord Advocate had properly conceded in Goatley v HMA39 and La 
Torre v HMA40 that devolution minutes were competent in proceedings 
under the 2003 Act on the basis that he was performing functions under 
that Act as a member of the then Scottish Executive. That position remained 
unchanged by the 2012 Act. Lord Hope noted that the ECtHR and 
Commission have repeatedly held that extradition hearings do not 
determine a criminal charge – something that will be discussed below. 
Emphasising the distinction between the criminal law and extradition, Lord 
Hope said that the view that extradition hearings were not criminal is 
reinforced on account of extradition being a reserved matter under the 1998 
Act and Scots criminal law being a devolved matter unless relating to a 
reserved matter. The roles given the Lord Advocate, Scottish Ministers and 
High Court under the 2003 Act are separate from the 1995 Act. Those roles, 
he noted “… are not made part of, but are provided for separately from, 
those that they are required to perform under the 1995 Act”.41 A final point 
made by Lord Hope in regard to the nature of extradition hearings is that 
there is explicit provision in the 2003 Act which generally excludes appeal 
to the Supreme Court (ss 114(13) and 32(13)). He suggested that the 
enactment of these provisions, in spite of the existence of s 124(2) of the 
1995 Act providing that an interlocutor from the High Court is final, 
evidences the distinction between extradition and general criminal 
procedure.  
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kapri v Lord Advocate provides that 
extradition hearings are not criminal proceedings for the purposes of 
appeals to it. That description stands in stark contrast to certain of the 
views expressed above including, interestingly, the subsequent decision of 
the High Court in the same case.42 The difference between views is the 
consequence of distinct law being relied upon to answer the question of 
what are extradition hearings. Instead of procedural and evidential rules, 
the law detailing the roles of the Lord Advocate and High Court in extradition 
and affecting the devolution settlement more generally was considered. It 
was noted that the Lord Advocate played a unique role within them – as a 
member of the Scottish Government representing the requesting state and 
not as a public prosecutor. It was relevant that that role, and that of the 
High Court in extradition, were governed by provisions within the 2003 Act 
and not the 1995 Act. The reserved nature of extradition under Schedule 5 
to the 1998 Act was also relevant. That fact marked a further distinction 
between extradition and the criminal law. Finally, the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR was referred to. That extradition hearings did not determine a 
criminal charge, weighed in favour of them not being criminal proceedings. 
In sum, in Kapri v Lord Advocate the Supreme Court addressed the nature 
of extradition hearings in a different context and with reference to distinct 
                                   
38 The High Court has held similarly in PB v HMA [2013] HCJAC 138, at para 8. 
39 Supra note 3. 
40 [2006] HCJAC 56. 
41 Supra note 17 at para 20. 
42 That being Kapri v HMA, supra note 6 
law than that of the courts which considered the issue in light of procedural 
and evidential matters. In doing so it adduced factors that shed new light 
upon the hearings. Those factors provide material support for the sui 
generis nature of extradition hearings.  
  
6. The Right to a Fair Trial 
   
Human rights litigation addressing the applicability of the right to a fair trial 
in extradition hearings is a third context in which the nature of the hearings 
has arisen. This jurisprudence follows arguments by requested persons that 
their extradition hearing should benefit from protection under article 6. In 
sum, the ECtHR has held that extradition hearings do not determine one’s 
civil rights or a criminal charge. It has also been held by the Supreme Court, 
however, that they determine a civil right of UK nationals.43 In this third 
context, then, there is again a contrasting understanding of extradition 
hearings. Determinative of the conclusions reached by these courts was, as 
above, the particular law relied upon. The ECtHR naturally considered the 
ECHR itself and its previous jurisprudence and that of the Commission. The 
Supreme Court relied upon those sources as well as public international law 
and the common law in coming to its conclusion. More precisely, largely 
determinative of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence were the terms of article 6, with 
the specific question being whether an extradition hearing entails the 
determination of a civil right or obligation, a criminal charge or neither of 
these. Article 6(1) begins “In the determination of his civil rights and 
obligations or of any criminal charge against him…”. It goes on to guarantee 
the right to a fair trial in a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law.44 It is the initial phrase of article 6(1) that is 
critical. This is because proceedings which do not determine one’s civil 
rights and obligations or a criminal charge are excluded from its protection. 
In other words, the nature of extradition hearings is vital in their being 
protected, or not, by article 6(1).  
 
The ECtHR, and European Commission of Human Rights, have held that 
extradition hearings do not determine one’s civil rights or obligations or a 
criminal charge. In Raf v Spain an applicant inter alia argued that article 
6(1) had been infringed on account of the length of time the extradition 
proceedings had taken. The ECtHR held on the point that “… extradition 
proceedings do not concern a dispute (contestation) over an applicant’s civil 
rights and obligations or the determination of a criminal charge against him 
or her within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention”.45 As regards the 
meaning of criminal charge the Commission in Farmakopoulos v Belgium 
                                   
43 [2012] UKSC 20. Whilst the case arose in England it is authoritative in Scotland. 
44 In contrast to article 6(1) articles 6(2) and 6(3) apply subsequent to one being 
criminally charged. Accordingly proceedings not following a criminal charge are 
similarly excluded from the protections found within them. Article 6(2) guarantees 
the presumption of innocence and article 6(3) inter alia the right to a lawyer and 
the right to examine witnesses against the accused.  
45  21 Dec. 2000, Application no. 53652/00, at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-22200. The Court also noted that the 
applicant did not have a right not to be extradited. 
stated “… that the words ‘determination of any criminal charge’ concern the 
process of examining whether an individual is guilty or innocent in respect 
of a criminal charge against him and do not refer to the proceedings in 
which the judicial authorities of a State decide whether the individual should 
be extradited to another country”.46 It is settled, then, that under the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR, extradition hearings are not criminal in the 
sense of determining a criminal charge because they do not examine 
whether a person is guilty or innocent.  
 
In a similar vein to its conclusion on criminal charge, the ECtHR has held 
that extradition does not concern a dispute over a civil right. In Mamatkulov 
and Askarov v Turkey, in a case about the fairness of Turkish extradition 
proceedings (as well as a future trial abroad), the ECtHR held that decisions 
regarding the entry, stay and deportation of aliens do not concern the 
determination of his civil rights or obligations within the meaning of article 
6(1). 47  ‘Civil’ in this context was equated with private law rights. As 
extradition law falls into the public sphere, the view holds, extradition 
hearings do not entail the determination of one’s civil rights and obligations. 
As Lester et al note the “… early jurisprudence of the ECtHR established 
that the use of the word ‘civil’ in art 6(1) incorporated the distinction 
between private and public law, with civil rights and obligations being rights 
and obligations in private law”.48 In Agee v UK the Commission stated: 
 … the right of an alien to reside in a particular country is a matter 
governed by public law. It considers that where the public authorities 
of a State decide to deport an alien on grounds of security, this 
constitutes an act of state falling within the public sphere and that it 
does not constitute a determination of his civil rights or obligations 
within the meaning of Art. 6. Accordingly, even though the decision 
to deport the applicant may have consequences in relation to his civil 
rights, in particular his reputation, the State is not required in such 
cases to grant a hearing conforming to the requirements of Art. 
6(1).49 
Whilst Agee v UK was concerned with deportation, a similar view pertains 
to extradition. According to the ECtHR, then, article 6(1) does not apply to 
extradition hearings because they do not determine one’s civil rights or 
obligations or a criminal charge. This conclusion of the ECtHR is negative. 
That of the Supreme Court in Kapri v HMA was similarly negative. Those 
courts decided what extradition hearings did not do and were not. Whilst of 
some use in coming to an understanding of extradition hearings what is 
preferable, of course, is a positive statement upon what they are and what 
                                   
46  8 February 1990, App No 11683/85, cited at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-82161, at p 69. It has been held, however, 
that a requested person has been charged with a criminal offence for the purposes 
of article 6(2), see P., R.H. and L.L. v Austria (5 Dec. 1989) App No. 15776/89. 
This case also confirms that article 6(3) does not apply to extradition hearings. 
47 (2005) 41 EHRR 494, at para 82. 
48 A Lester, D Pannick and J Herberg (eds.), Human Rights Law and Practice, (Third 
Edition), LexisNexis 2009 at p 283. 
49  17 Dec. 1976, application 7729/76, cited at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-74884, at para 28. 
they do. It was the Supreme Court in Pomiechowski v Poland that took a 
rare step and did just that, pronouncing, in a sense, upon what extradition 
hearings actually do. 
 
Pomiechowski v Poland broke new ground in the application of article 6 to 
extradition hearings and, in the process, in the understanding of extradition 
hearings themselves. It arose out of the short and inflexible time limits then 
applying under the 2003 Act to the rights of appeal of requested persons 
and requesting authorities.50 British citizen Halligen had failed to comply 
with the 14 day time limit for the filing and service of notice of appeal to 
the Crown Prosecution Service applying to US extraditions. The High Court 
had held that his appeal was time-barred. Before the Supreme Court 
Halligen inter alia invoked article 6(1). The Secretary of State contested its 
relevance to decisions to extradite. In coming to its decision the Supreme 
Court focused upon the distinction between aliens and citizens. Lord Mance, 
giving the leading opinion, noted that all the authorities cited to the court 
concerned the extradition or expulsion of non-nationals.51 He also referred 
to the rights given to aliens subject to expulsion under article 1 of Protocol 
7 to the Convention.52 What this indicated, he held, was that state parties 
understood that expulsion proceedings of aliens were excluded from the 
scope of article 6(1). The exclusion of nationals did not necessarily follow. 
He noted that British nationals possess an entitlement to remain within the 
UK under both international law and at common law.53 The presence of that 
entitlement, deemed a ‘civil right’ by the Supreme Court, paved the way for 
the application of article 6(1) in the case.54 It was held that extradition 
proceedings of a British citizen involved ‘the determination’ of that civil 
right, and since the enjoyment of one’s common law right to remain within 
the UK was suspended a requested national was entitled to a fair hearing. 
This case is an important addition to the body of jurisprudence related to 
the understanding of extradition hearings. It adds a new dimension to it. It 
is that extradition hearings are, in some sense at least, a civil proceeding. 
As with the two contexts discussed above, distinct law was relied upon to 
justify this particular understanding. The Supreme Court relied upon not 
only article 6 and ECtHR jurisprudence but also English common law55 and 
public international law. Both the particular decision in Pomiechowski v 
                                   
50 The inflexibility has since been addressed by s 160 of the Anti-social Behaviour, 
Crime and Policing Act 2014. 
51 Supra note 43 at para 31. 
52 The UK has not signed nor ratified Protocol 7.  
53 Amongst the authorities cited was Van Duyn v Home Office, [1975] Ch 358 where 
the European Court of Justice stated that international law provides that a state is 
precluded from refusing to let its nationals enter or reside within it, at para 22.  
54 Whilst concurring, reluctantly, with the majority Lady Hale thought it perhaps 
questionable whether the right of citizens to enter and remain their countries 
counts as a ‘civil right’ for the purpose of the right to a fair hearing under article 
6(1), at para 49. 
55 The civil right that the Supreme Court identified was inter alia based in English 
common law. The question of whether Scottish common law similarly provides is 
perhaps moot. Whilst Lord Mance employed the term ‘British’ when providing that 
that category of persons had a common law right to come and remain within the 
jurisdiction he referred to Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England in 
support 15th ed. (1809) Vol 1 at p 137. 
Poland and the law used to come to that conclusion support a broad 
understanding of extradition hearings, and which encompasses their sui 
generis nature and affectation by international considerations. 
 
7. Extradition Hearings Understood 
 
Extradition hearings are clearly understood in a variety of ways. There is no 
single or over-arching conceptualisation. The differences in understanding 
generally turn on the context in which consideration of them has arisen. As 
seen, though, in the context of procedure and evidence there is discrepancy 
in view. In reaching decisions in each of the contexts, courts have referred 
to different law. This, of course, is entirely sensible. In deciding upon 
matters of procedure and evidence, appeal or human rights, courts 
rightfully relied upon the rules that have been enacted or concluded in those 
areas and the related jurisprudence. Conflating the various understandings 
that emerged within each of the three contexts and conceptualising them 
in light of the purpose, nature and influences upon extradition it is 
submitted that it is appropriate to designate extradition hearings as sui 
generis quasi-criminal proceedings affected by international considerations. 
Each element of this understanding will be justified in turn. Firstly, though, 
it is useful to state why it is desirable to alight on a single conception. 
 
7.1 Why a Single Understanding is Desirable 
 
There are several reasons why it is desirable to come to a single 
understanding of extradition hearings – why it matters. Some of these are 
abstract and some applied. Firstly, greater understanding and appreciation 
would follow if what is after all a single thing – an extradition hearing – is 
conceived in a unitary way. It is a single entity because it is governed by 
only one set of rules and it exists for only one purpose in fact. The 2003 
Act, rules of procedure and evidence and body of case law that regulate and 
affect extradition hearings are, by and large, settled. As are the rules 
tangential to extradition hearings. The rules governing appeal to the 
Supreme Court and human rights law are good examples of the latter. 
Together these rules comprise a single set norms, there are no alternatives. 
What hearings do in fact is also fixed. This is simply that they consider the 
possible rendition of accused and convicted persons from the UK to a 
requesting third state. They do nothing else. They have only one role. If the 
rules governing extradition hearings were fluid, or if the hearings had more 
than one purpose in fact, then it would not be unreasonable if they were 
multifariously conceived. As the opposite is the case there is considerable 
weight in favour of a single understanding. Such a position would bring 
consistency as between the differing lines of jurisprudence – procedure and 
evidence, appeal and human rights. The particular context in which a 
question arises in an extradition case would cease to be relevant to the 
understanding of hearings themselves. Rather, that conception would be 
unitary yet wide enough to accommodate the distinct issues that arise 
within them. Further, a single understanding of extradition hearings can 
more readily entail a positive conception of them. It is preferable that 
extradition hearings are conceived in a positive light as well as a negative 
one. In other words, they should be understood in terms of what they are 
and do as well as what they are not and do not do. A single positive 
understanding would bring consistency, aid coherence and reflect reality – 
simply, they have to be something and that should be a single thing.  
 
An applied justification for a single positive conceptualisation of extradition 
hearings is that it would provide a platform from which the law could further 
develop. As seen, extradition-specific rules are found in the 2003 Act and 
the Criminal Procedure Rules. Adding to these has been a distinct body of 
rules developed by the courts. These include the recognition that SUEs 
apply, the partial operation of article 6 and the relaxation of certain rules 
of evidence. Arising from these developments is, debatably, an emerging 
view that discrete extradition-specific rules take precedence, or at least 
prima facie apply, over rules of criminal procedure and evidence. This can 
be seen as an emerging hybrid procedural and evidential code. Were 
extradition hearings generally understood in a single positive way Scottish 
and UK courts would be able to explicitly recognise and contribute to what 
has been emerging. Courts would no longer feel compelled to cleave to 
views that fail to adequately reflect reality, and extradition law could 
develop unhindered by the jurisprudential attachment to their criminal 
nature. Finally, a single positive understanding of extradition hearings 
would facilitate comparative understanding by bringing the UK in line with 
a number of its extradition partners. In most civil law states, for example, 
extradition is viewed as “… a measure of international judicial assistance in 
restoring a fugitive to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try him… ”. 56 
They are not criminal, but considered procedural. In the US the Department 
of Justice Attorneys’ Manual provides that “Extraditions are their own 
category of case: they are neither criminal nor civil cases, although many 
concepts from criminal law apply in extradition proceedings”. 57  These 
conceptions accurately describe UK extradition hearings in fact. A single 
understanding of extradition hearings matters for all these reasons.  
 
7.2 Sui generis 
 
Extradition hearings are sui generis. The simple and literal justification for 
this designation is that they are unlike any other type of judicial proceeding. 
They are undoubtedly related to criminal matters, yet are apart from them. 
They do not envisage a Scottish or UK criminal prosecution at all, nor are 
they subsequent to one. They are, however, governed as nearly as may be 
by criminal rules and the appellate hierarchy is criminal. Extradition 
hearings are also clearly not orthodox civil proceedings. They do not 
consider private law rights and obligations and they necessarily involve the 
state exercising a sovereign function. They do affect the civil rights of UK 
nationals, however. The hearings with the closest affinity to extradition are 
deportation proceedings. They are similar in that they entail the removal of 
an individual from the UK and that they can give rise to human rights 
                                   
56  Shearer, I., Extradition in International Law, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1971 at p 157. 
57  Criminal Resource Manual section 614, cited at 
https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-614-procedure-district-
court. Canada takes a roughly similar approach to the US, with evidence at 
extradition hearings governed by ss 32-37 of the Extradition Act 1999. 
concerns in certain circumstances. 58  The similarity only goes so far, 
however. Deportation proceedings differ in origins, purpose and governing 
law. Deportation proceedings originate in a UK decision to expel the person 
from its territory, the origins of an extradition are found in a request from 
a third territory. The purpose of deportation is to remove an ‘undesirable’ 
person from the country.59 The purpose of extradition is the facilitation of a 
prosecution or imposition of a sentence in a third state. The law governing 
deportation is largely found in the Immigration Acts60, with the power to 
deport being found in section 5 of the Immigration Act 1971. Extradition 
law is largely found in the 2003 Act. Extradition hearings are, therefore, 
unlike deportation proceedings in important ways. Indeed, whilst sharing 
commonalities with other forms of proceedings, criminal being the pre-
eminent example, extradition hearings have unique features and 





Extradition hearings are quasi-criminal.61 They are designed to facilitate a 
criminal prosecution or the imposition of a sentence following a criminal 
conviction in a third country. In other words, they exist for criminal and 
punitive purposes. Extradition clearly acts to address international and 
transnational crime. Lord Thomas’ quote from Polish Judicial Authorities v 
Celinski at the outset of this article62 emphasises the criminal purposes of 
extradition, inter alia stating that those accused of crimes should be brought 
to trial and those convicted of crimes should serve their sentences. 
Extradition hearings resemble criminal proceedings. They are largely 
governed by the rules of criminal procedure and evidence. The resemblance 
flows from s 206 of the 2003 Act which inter alia provides that questions 
arising at extradition hearings are to be decided by applying the law that 
would apply if the proceedings were proceedings for an offence. In Scotland 
an appeal of a decision by the Sheriff of Lothian and the Borders is heard 
by the High Court, not the Court of Session. In certain cases evidence is 
                                   
58 In Balodis-Klocko v Latvia, [2014] EWHC 2661 (Admin) it was held that there is 
no distinction between the immigration line of authority and that of extradition as 
regards human rights arguments. 
59 A further difference is that UK nationals cannot be deported. 
60 ‘Immigration Acts’ is defined by section 61 of the Borders Act 2007, and includes 
ten different statutes commencing with the Immigration Act 1971. The difference 
in rules of evidence between extradition and deportation was noted above. A 
further mode of expelling an alien from the UK is administrative removal, governed 
by section 10 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. 
61 For the present purposes ‘quasi-criminal’ is taken to denote something that 
relates to and resembles criminal proceedings but is apart from them. The term 
has been applied in a range of circumstances from regulatory and environmental 
offences to Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures and gang-related 
injunctions. See, for example, Jones v Birmingham City Council. [2018] EWCA Civ 
1189 as regards gang-related injunctions and Adshead, J., Doing Justice to the 
Environment, (2013) 77(3) Journal of Criminal Law 215 in regard to environmental 
law.  
62 Supra note 1. 
heard against the requested person. Further weighing towards the criminal 
nature of extradition hearings is that requested persons can be detained 
pending their hearing, under ss 9(4) and 77(4) of the 2003 Act, or they can 
be granted bail. Clearly, then, extradition hearings have a close proximity 
to criminal proceedings and the criminal law.  
 
The affinity between criminal proceedings and extradition hearings only 
goes so far – there are material differences between them. The most 
obvious point is, of course, that extradition hearings do not lead to or follow 
a criminal prosecution within Scotland.63 There are consistent statements 
by the ECtHR and UK courts that extradition hearings do not entail the 
determination of a criminal charge for the purposes of article 6.64 They are 
not criminal in this sense. There are also definite limitations in the 
application of rules of criminal procedure and evidence. Both in general 
terminology and in the details of certain specific rules, criminal procedure 
and evidence fails to align with extradition law. From the basic fact that 
there are no preliminary or intermediate diets and trials in extradition, to 
the point that the time limits in criminal procedure are inapt on account of 
there being no complaint (let alone the fact that the 2003 Act itself governs 
the schedule of extradition). The relaxation of the rules of evidence also 
differentiates extradition from criminal proceedings. The distinct role played 
by the Lord Advocate is also relevant. So too is the fact that international 
and common law rules entitling nationals to remain within the country can 
be affected through extradition alone, as seen in Pomiechowski v Poland. 
Overall, it is reasonable to conclude that whilst extradition hearings 
resemble criminal proceedings they are apart from them. They are 
accurately described as quasi-criminal.  
 
7.4 Affected by International Considerations  
 
Extradition hearings are affected by international considerations. It is 
important to include this fact within the understanding because 
international law and policy concerns are a sin qua non of extradition itself. 
Simply, extradition is an inherently international exercise based upon 
bilateral or multilateral agreements. Recognising this is the House of Lords 
Select Committee on Extradition Law, which has noted that “Extradition is 
a discrete legal process but it operates within the context of other legal, 
political and international considerations”.65 The Framework Decision on the 
European Arrest Warrant, the European Convention on Extradition 1957 
and a network of bilateral extradition treaties form the basis of the UK’s 
                                   
63 There have been cases where extradition requests have spawned attempts to 
force the commencement of a domestic criminal investigation and possible 
prosecution, see for example R. (on the application of Bermingham) v Director of 
the Serious Fraud Office [2006] EWHC 200 (Admin). 
64 Such as in Raf v Spain, supra note 45, in the ECtHR and R (Al Fawwaz) v 
Governor of Brixton Prison [2001] UKHL 69 at para 87. 
65 Supra note 1 at p 9. 
extradition relations.66 Diplomatic assurances also have come to play an 
increasingly important role in extradition.67 These treaties and instruments 
have had a material impact upon UK extradition law and practice. A number 
of the central features of the 2003 Act give effect to the UK’s international 
legal obligations. Describing the origins of the 2003 Act are its Explanatory 
Notes which inter alia provide “Crime, particularly serious crime, is 
becoming increasingly international in nature and criminals can flee justice 
by crossing borders with increasing ease. Improved judicial co-operation 
between nations is needed to tackle this development. The reform of the 
United Kingdom’s extradition law is designed to contribute to that 
process”.68  As noted, Part 1 of the 2003 Act specifically provides for the 
terms of the European Arrest Warrant. 69  In a different vein, the 
international dimension of extradition has been held to affect the 
interpretation of the 2003 Act. As Lord Nimmo Smith in Campbell v HMA 
stated “It seems to me to be inappropriate to approach the construction 
and application of sec 14 solely or mainly from the standpoint of our 
domestic law. The international dimension is inherent in extradition 
law…”.70 
 
Affecting UK extradition hearings are international policy concerns. These 
manifest themselves in the UK’s position towards comity in extradition 
jurisprudence and practice. Demonstrating this is Caddoux v Bow Street 
Magistrates’ Court where it was stated that “… once the request for 
extradition was received… there were powerful reasons of comity for giving 
it priority…”. 71  More generally, there are a considerable number of 
extradition cases where the decision turns on the public policy interest in 
adhering to international agreements and acting to combat international 
and transnational criminality. An example from the Supreme Court is Norris 
v US, where Lord Collins noted “The public interest in the prevention and 
suppression of crime, which includes the public interest in the United 
Kingdom's compliance with extradition arrangements, is not outweighed by 
the mutual dependency and the ill-health, both physical and mental, of Mr 
and Mrs Norris”.72 Two further factors illustrate the international nature of 
extradition and extradition hearings. The first is the significant role of the 
ECHR and increasingly EU law. From the seminal case of Soering v UK73 in 
                                   
66  Bilateral treaties from the basis of the UK’s relationship with Category 2 
territories, a list of them is found here: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/extradition-
processes-and-review.  
67  See Grozdanova, R., The United Kingdom and Diplomatic Assurances: A 
Minimalist Approach towards the Anti-Torture Norm, (2015) International Criminal 
Law Review 369. 
68 Cited at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/41/notes/division/3, at para 
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69 The Explanatory Notes also provide “This Act includes provisions implementing 
the following European Community Legislation: the Council Framework Decision of 
13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures 
between Member States (2002/584/JHA)”, ibid, at para 12. 
70 Supra note 32 at para 32.  
71 [2004] EWHC 642 (Admin), at para 11.  
72 Supra note 1 at para 131. 
73 (1989) 11 EHRR 439. 
1989 to the present time, European human rights jurisprudence has had an 
impact upon UK extradition law. EU law, including the Framework Decision 
and the decisions of the CJEU have also come to exert an impact.74 Second, 
the law has developed so as to require extradition hearings to increasingly 
consider extraterritorial circumstances and law. Death row in the US, prison 
conditions in Taiwan and medical facilities in Poland, for example, have 
come within the purview of Scottish and UK courts.75 The forum bar to 
extradition found in ss 19B and 83A of the 2003 Act can require 
consideration of foreign circumstances by English and Northern Irish courts. 
Finally, the double criminality requirement can act to require the 
examination of a third state’s criminal law. Overall, the impact of 
international law and policy upon extradition hearings is such that it is not 
unreasonable to state that they have existential relevance. It is therefore 
appropriate, indeed necessary, to acknowledge the effect that international 
considerations have within and upon extradition hearings.  
 
8. Conclusion  
 
Extradition hearings are understood in varying ways. These 
conceptualisations arise from their nature being considered in differing 
contexts and with reference to distinct law. Their essential features can be 
identified across those contexts. Conflating the various understandings of 
extradition hearings – criminal and sui generis in the context of procedure 
and evidence, not criminal proceedings for the purposes of appeals to the 
Supreme Court and determinative of a civil right for UK nationals in the 
context of a right to a fair trial – leads to the overall conclusion that they 
are sui generis quasi-criminal proceedings affected by international 
considerations. This designation, whilst operative across the UK, is 
particularly apt in a Scottish context. The unsettled nature of Scottish case 
law, the relative dearth of Scottish procedural and evidential extradition 
rules and the particular provisions governing appeals from the High Court 
to the Supreme Court support this contention. A single accurate positive 
conceptualisation of extradition hearings – it is submitted the designation 
just given – matters. Important decisions in distinct areas turn on how they 
are understood. Consistency across those areas and conceptual clarity and 
realism are the benefits. It is time to recognise extradition hearings for what 
they actually are and in light of the various areas where that matters.  
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